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Key Points
1. Despite continued widespread poverty, Mozambique has made great strides towards
sustainable food security in the past five years, based largely on improvements in
production and in the food marketing system.
2. The management of food aid in Mozambique during the 1992 Southern Africa drought
had positive effects on the development of the informal food marketing sector and the
small-scale maize milling sector, both of which have contributed to the improved market
performance and food security observed since that time.
3. Lack of coordination between commercial and emergency food aid programs during the
1992 drought created serious problems of oversupply and low prices for a full year after
the ending of the drought.
4. To protect the progress that Mozambique has attained in the area of food market
performance and food security, and to ensure continued positive development in this
regard, it is imperative that commercial and emergency food aid programs be better
coordinated in future drought crises, and that both be designed with the aim of meeting
the humanitarian needs of the population while significantly enhancing the role that food
markets play in responding to such crises.
5. Specific steps include a) improving the marketing and household level data content of
Vulnerability Assessment methods to better assess markets’ and households’ abilities to
respond to drought, b) implementing market facilitating mechanisms such as aggressive
market information at national, regional and international levels; increased access to
foreign exchange credit to facilitate private imports; and coordinated use of cash for
work, monetization and market monitoring in specific areas to help markets respond
where food aid distributions would be otherwise be necessary, and c) actively publicizing
the details of the drought response program. 2
I.  Introduction
A decade after the beginning of economic liberalization, and five years after the ending of the
country’s devastating civil war, Mozambique’s food system has made impressive strides in
increasing availability of and access to food for most of its population.  Staple food production
has set records each of the past four years and an entirely new food marketing system has
emerged to channel this production to consumers.  As a result, real prices of a wide range of
food staples have fallen dramatically, and their availability in markets has increased.  As market
performance has improved, there has been a parallel improvement in nutritional indicators among
children in most areas of the country. 
This progress would not have been possible without the ending in 1992 of the country’s long
civil war; generally good rains since that time have also played an important role.  Yet
Mozambique’s success is due to more than peace and rain; policy decisions beginning in the early
1990's were instrumental in creating the preconditions for the nation’s food system to respond
effectively to the improved political and climatic environment since 1992.  The handling of
commercial food aid prior to and during the 1992 Southern Africa drought was one of the
important policy decisions, facilitating as it did the emergence of an increasingly dynamic
informal marketing and small-scale maize milling sector.  Yet the commercial and emergency
food aid responses in 1992 also suffered from a serious lack of coordination, which created
problems of oversupply and low prices, and disrupted domestic marketing of maize for nearly a
year after the drought was over.  
It needs also to be remembered that, despite the rapid development of food markets in the
country over the past decade (and especially the past five years), Mozambique’s food system
remains very small-scale, with high unit costs, and subject to great volatility.  Clearly, significant
improvements remain to be made, and must be made in food market performance if needed
progress in food security is to be assured.  Given the fact that Southern Africa and much of
Mozambique are subject to drought every three- to-seven years, food aid policy will have
important effects on how the food marketing system develops.  With a potentially serious
drought looming in 1998, it is imperative that government and donors learn both the positive and
negative lessons from 1992 and continue to advance their thinking and practice regarding the
appropriate role of food aid and food markets in responding to such a crisis.  
This paper first traces the progress the country has made in food security during the past five
years, focusing on the role that markets have played in improving food access for households.  It
then highlights the enormous challenges the country continues to face in this regard before
turning to the issue of planning for drought in 1998 and succeeding years.  It draws heavily from
the 1992 experience in Mozambique, and emphasizes the need to rethink emergency and
commercial food aid response to protect the progress already achieved in the private food
marketing system and encourage its further development.
  3
II.  Food Markets and Food Security: Progress and Continuing Challenges
The marketing of food through free and open markets in Mozambique is a very recent
phenomenon.  Legal barriers to such activity began to fall less than a decade ago, and engaging
in such activities outside of urban centers became safe only with the ending of the civil war five
years ago.  Prior to this time, both Colonial and FRELIMO
1 governments strictly controlled food
marketing with a system of geographical monopolies, fixed prices at all levels of the system, and
heavy direct government participation.  As a result, like many young systems, Mozambique’s
private food marketing system has shown tremendous progress while continuing to suffer from
glaring weaknesses.  It is important to keep both of these facts in mind as government and
donors decide how best to achieve continued improvement in food security in the country.
Progress to Date  
Progress toward improved and more sustainable food security in recent years in Mozambique is
evident in four dimensions: 1) increasing per capita calorie availability in the face of dramatic
reductions in food aid, 2) lower and more stable prices throughout the country for a range of
food staples, 3) a food system which now provides consumers with a broader range of low-cost
staples from which to choose, and  4) improved food market integration.  One important result
of these changes is that rates of child stunting have fallen from 13% in 1992 to 10.8% in 1996
and the number of districts with rates of 16% or greater (indicating high risk for malnutrition)
fell from 39 in 1992 to 23 in 1996 (GOM 1997).  From 1991 (prior to the Southern Africa
drought of 1992) to 1996, stunting rates declined in 7 of 10 provinces and in Maputo city.
2
Total cereal production and per capita calorie availability from cereals in Mozambique have
increased substantially in recent years, and the contribution of food aid to availability has fallen
dramatically (Table 1, Figure 1).  Production has increased every year since the 1992 Southern
Africa drought, and in 1997/98 was the highest on record, 2.5 times that in 1989/90.  Per capita
calorie availability from all cereals in 1997/98 is projected to be higher than any year since at
least 1989/90.  Food aid’s contribution fell to only 4% in 1996/97, and is projected to rise
slightly to 7% during 1997/98, down from 72% during the 1992 Southern Africa drought and
from an average of 49% for the three years prior to the drought.  During the past two years,
food aid shipments have been dominated by commercial wheat food aid for wheat millers, more
an indicator of donor government needs to dispose of surpluses than of inability on
Mozambique’s part to feed itself.
This increased availability has been accompanied by lower and more stable prices of staple foods
throughout the country.  White maize in the capital city of Maputo demonstrates this trend most
dramatically (Figure 2).  Comparing pre- and post-drought periods (March 1990 to March 1992,
and March 1993 to September 1997, respectively), real mean prices during the latter fell by 31%
and their standard deviation fell by 27%.  Prices of other staples have also fallen in all regions of
the country.  Table 2 presents information on real price trends from 1991 through 1997 for six
products, three domestically produced (white maize grain, “manteiga” bean and peanut) and
three which are primarily imported (rice, brown sugar and imported oil) in the three principal
cities of the country.  Results show a strong and broad-based trend towards lower real prices
during the period: in 16 of 18 cases, the trend is negative and statistically significant, with
reductions ranging from 6.3% to nearly 55%.4
Lower and more stable white maize grain prices for urban consumers have been complemented
by continued availability in urban markets of low-cost food staples such as whole (“99%”) maize
meals and maize grains, complementing higher cost staples such as refined maize meals and rice
(Figure 3).  The disappearance of yellow maize grain and meals from markets in Maputo since
the end of 1996 is surprising, given Maputo consumers’ demonstrated willingness to switch to
yellow maize with modest price discounts (Tschirley and Santos, 1995; Jayne, et.  al., 1995). 
Low income consumers are the quickest to switch, and have thus paid the highest cost from the
market’s recent failure to make these products readily available. Nonetheless, it is known that
commercial traders in rural areas of the South continue to import yellow maize for milling into
whole meal, attracted by the low prices in South Africa.
3
Lower and more stable food prices and continued availability of a range of staples with varying
prices, reflect a marketing system which has succeeded in connecting surplus regions within and
outside the country with consuming regions in Mozambique.  Donovan (1996) showed
significant improvements in market integration between the Center and South in the post-war
and post-drought period, and measures of market integration within the north show appreciable
improvements in that region in the past two years (MAP/MSU 1997).  Above all, it is known
that Mozambican traders have regularly supplied the South of the country with surpluses of
maize grain and other staples from the Center, with white and yellow maize meals from South
Africa and, during drought years (1995) or years of significant exports (1997), have reached into
the north to supply both the Center and South with staples.  This active north-south trade within
the country has been carried-out almost exclusively by unregistered traders, many of them
women, who have entered the market in the past five- to six years.
Determinants  
The ending of the war was the sine qua non for improvements in food security.  Yet the rapid
progress the country has made in the past five to six years is based on more than the ending of
the war; policy choices made prior to the peace accords created the conditions for rapid recovery
once hostilities ceased.  The key policy changes related to general food marketing policy, and to
specific policies on the monetization of yellow maize food aid.  
Starting in 1987, the country embarked on a program of donor-financed economic reform under
the Economic Rehabilitation Program (ERP).  This program would introduce Mozambique for
the first time in its history to relatively free and open markets.
4  By late 1990, national policy
makers had removed restrictions on product movement across district and provincial boundaries,
and had eliminated the system, in place since colonial times, of official geographical monopolies
for registered private traders.  Some response to these changes could be seen by late 1990, but
risk of attack and restrictive practices by local authorities made progress slow (MAP/MSU
1990).  By the 1991 harvest, evidence was emerging in the north of the country that informal
traders in rural areas had begun to compete with some of the previous monopolists, paying
higher average prices to farmers (MAP/MSU 1991).  By at least 1992, it was clear that new
entrants dominated the food marketing system in the capital city of Maputo, despite the
government’s continued policy that basic foods should be sold through the government shops in
the Novo Sistema de Abastecimento (NSA) at official prices.  These traders, nearly all of  them
unlicenced, handled most of the domestic production which was able to reach the city, and also
regularly brought maize meal, wheat flour, sugar, vegetable oil, and other food products to the5
city from Swaziland and South Africa (MAP/MSU 1993a; Sahn and Desai 1992).  
Concurrent with the disintegration of the ration shop system and the emergence of the informal
trading sector, donors were looking for more market-oriented means of distributing monetized
food aid.  Beginning with shipments in mid-1991, donors negotiated with the Government of
Mozambique for the grain to be sold directly to registered private wholesalers ("consignees") at
fixed prices in the port cities.  Many consignees were included, ensuring a  competitive system at
this level (Tschirley, et. al. 1996).  These consignees then sold into the highly competitive
informal market, which, in combination with the economic reforms under ERP, fueled the
growth of this trading sector and of the small-scale maize milling sector.
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These two sectors were flourishing by the time the peace accords were signed in October 1992,
and have provided the foundation for Mozambique’s progress in food security since that time.
They have done so by 1) linking rural and urban areas through trade flows, 2) linking
Mozambique with its neighbors through active cross-border imports of food in the South and,
more recently, exports of maize grain and pigeon pea from the Center and North, and 3)
channeling maize through the small-scale milling sector.  The following paragraphs will explain
each of these three points.
Within the informal trading sector, a class of entrepreneurial inter-regional wholesalers emerged
to link production and consumption zones with active trade flows.  Beginning strongly in 1994,
and with even greater coverage during the drought year of 1995, these traders scoured central
and northern Mozambique for maize, beans, and peanuts to be sold in urban centers (see
MAP/MSU 1995a for more information on this sector).  Measures of integration between
southern, central, and northern maize markets improved dramatically during these years,
attesting to the effects of this trade (see Donovan 1996 for evidence on southern-central
integration).  
This trade has long extended across Mozambique’s borders for imports, and recently has done
the same on exports.  Active cross-border trade in foodstuffs was evident in Maputo well before
the end of the war, and was instrumental during that time in increasing food availability for poor
consumers (MAP/MSU 1993).  This trade has continued to develop since the peace accords,
with South Africa becoming the primary source of supply, and played a key role in containing
price increases in southern Mozambique during the 1995/96 hungry season.  Production that
year had been relatively poor, and seasonal food price rises began shortly after the harvest. 
When news of reduced food aid shipments reached markets in January and February 1996, prices
surged.  Informal traders continued their long-established practice of bringing white and yellow
maize meals from South Africa, stabilizing prices in the capital and resulting in an unusual two
month “price inversion” where prices were lower in the perpetually deficit Maputo market than
in normally surplus zones of the Center. The ease of changing money in the informal foreign
exchange market has been an important factor facilitating this trade.  Formal imports of rice from
the world market have also contributed to food security by maintaining a steady availability of
this product, very little of which is produced in the country.
Exports of maize and other staples from northern and central provinces began in 1996/97 and
have developed more strongly in 1997/98.  Cereals production during 1996/97 set a new record,6
resulting in very low producer prices through most of the year, especially in the surplus Center
and North.  These low producer prices continued into the 1997 harvest, which once again set a
new record (see Table 1).  However, significant seasonal price rises began to be seen in
September, and continued in October (five and six months after the beginning of the harvest). 
Producer prices in the Center rose by more than 75% from beginning September to beginning
November, while those in the North rose between 33% and 45% during the same period.  This
price rise is associated with very active export trade with Malawi and Zambia, as well as exports
outside of the region.  Official data show exports of about 30,000 mt of maize grain during the
first six months of the year, but unofficial estimates through September are that up to 100,000
mt have left the country.  These are significant quantities in a country with production of little
over 1,000,000 mt in 1997 and estimated marketings of  20-25%.  There has also been a
growing trade in pigeon peas both within and outside the region, though official figures are not
currently available on the volumes of that trade.  
A very important result of this opening of the export market is that larger and better capitalized
formal sector traders have become more active in the food trade.  As long as this trade was
confined to domestic markets, these larger traders preferred to devote their resources to higher
value consumer goods where they could earn more attractive margins.  With the possibility now
of exporting several thousand metric tons at a time, several of the most important northern
traders have entered the maize market, frequently relying on informals to perform the assembly
function.  This entry of larger traders into the food market holds important implications for the
future development of the agricultural economy in the north of the country, an issue which will
be examined further below.
In urban areas, the growth of the informal trade made it possible for the small-scale milling
sector to flourish.  Prior to liberalization, grain was channeled through a system of official
geographical monopolies at fixed prices, eventually reaching the state buying agency
AGRICOM, which then sold the grain destined for milling to large industrial mills.  These mills
produced refined white meal which, due to high processing costs, the state subsidized for most
urban consumers through its NSA shops.  The enormous costs that such a centralized and capital
intensive system imposes on consumers and government budgets have been well documented in
Zimbabwe and Kenya (Jayne, et. al., 1995).  As in these countries, liberalization in Mozambique
brought dramatic growth in the number of small hammer mills: 93% of these mills operating in
Maputo as of early 1994 had been purchased since 1987, when the ERP was initiated and when
yellow maize food aid quantities began to increase (Jayne, et.  al., 1995).  These small hammer
mills, which now number over one thousand spread throughout the country (MAP/MSU 1995b),
ensure access by poor urban (and, increasingly, rural) consumers to cheap white and yellow
whole meals, stretching their limited purchasing power. 
Continuing Challenges
Despite this progress, food marketing in Mozambique remains very small-scale, suffers from high
unit costs, and is subject to great volatility.  The vast majority of retail trade is conducted by
many thousands of traders who transact less than 50 kg per day.  Informal wholesalers typically
do not transact more than 10-15 tons every two weeks, and many move much less than this.  As
a result, unit margins and returns to capital need to be high for traders simply to earn a livable
wage.  7
In Maputo in 1992, retail traders of maize grain and whole meals earned net margins of 8%-19%
on capital turned-over every one or two days (MAP/MSU 1993). Annual returns to capital were
1,500% to 7,000%.  Yet the typical trader transacted only about 50 kg of product per day and
earned an income equal to only 6%-27% of that needed to feed a family of average size at the
time.  
Informal wholesalers, who dominate the north-south trade in the country today, tend also to be
small scale. Based on interviews with three wholesalers in Maputo who regularly purchase maize
grain in the center of the country, Table 3 shows the return to capital that these traders would
require to feed an average-size family from their earnings as traders.  The smallest of the three
would require a net margin of 14.6% and an annual return to capital of 381%; the largest a
margin of 4.1% and an annual return of 107%.  These are not the scales of operation that are
needed if costs are to be reduced and food security improved for poor consumers.
Added to the costs of small-scale operations are very high transport costs.  Transporting grain
40 km from key production zones of the center to major markets in the same region in June 1997
(the dry season, when roads are most passable) cost 19%-25% of the sales price in the major
market.  Transporting that grain from this major market to Maputo in the south brought
transport costs to 33%-55% of the sales price in Maputo.  This combination of high transport
costs and high unit margins reduces prices for producers and increases them for consumers,
reducing the food security of both.
Price volatility continues to be a serious problem, perhaps illustrated most clearly this year. 
Despite another record crop, maize prices have risen 33% to 75% during the past two months in
producing areas of the country in response to the export of as much as 100,000 mt of maize. 
Without substantial commercial imports of grain (commercial maize food aid is not being
contemplated), prices rises could rival the 120-250% seasonal increases seen in late 1995 and
early 1996, occasioned by the poor harvest in 1995.
In summary, Mozambique’s experience over the past decade illustrates both the promise and the
limitations of liberalization.  Due initially to government’s inability to enforce centrally planned
economic policies, but increasingly over time to active policy reform, an environment was
created in which markets could function relatively free of legal constraints.  In response, a new
class of traders and small-scale millers emerged, grew and began to differentiate, linking urban
markets with rural production areas and overland sources of imports.  This process was well
underway prior to the ending of the war in 1992, when this trade provided a critical complement
to the large volumes of food aid that fed the cities; after the war, it was the basis for the
impressive reductions in real prices and improvements in market integration that have been
observed.  Yet the system remains small-scale, high-cost, and volatile.  These problems are
structural and will not be resolved without greatly increased investment in the food system from
both the public and private sectors.  The “easy” gains have largely been realized; future progress
is likely to be slower and require a sustained commitment from government and donors to
policies and investments that reduce costs and volatility.  Given the recurrent nature of drought
in Mozambique and the Southern Africa region, policies for drought response will figure highly
among those that must be carefully evaluated to ensure that they contribute to, rather than
detract from, these goals.8
III.  Planning for Drought in 1998 and Beyond
As government and donors attempt to protect the gains already made in Mozambique’s food
marketing system and encourage its further development, at least three factors argue for decisive
steps to ensure an enhanced role for markets in responding to drought in Southern Africa.  First,
food market liberalization in food exporting developed economies has reduced their food
surpluses, and food aid resources have fallen dramatically as a result.  This is especially true in
the United States, where the program which channels government-owned surpluses into
emergency food aid (section 416b) has all but disappeared, and where resources for government-
to-government grants for the purchase of commercial food aid (Title III) fell by 1995 to little
over 20% of their previous levels in nominal terms (lower in real terms).  Only Title II managed
to maintain its resource levels between 1991 and 1995. 
Second, drought is a recurrent event in Mozambique and in the Southern African region,
occurring typically once every three-to-seven years.  Even in the absence of serious reductions in
the availability of food aid resources, it seems obvious that countries experiencing such frequent
crises need to strengthen their ability to deal with them in a financially sustainable manner.  Since
serious reductions in food aid resources have occurred and appear likely to persist, developing
such self-reliant strategies is imperative.  In light also of the severe budgetary restrictions that
many countries operate under, now and in the foreseeable future, strategies that do not give a
central role to markets in drought response will simply not be sustainable.  
Finally, the economic liberalization of the past decade means that continued improvement in the
quality of life in Mozambique and other countries in the region depends fundamentally on
improved performance of its markets, especially for food.
6  Past approaches to the programming,
pricing and distribution of food aid have had negative effects on the performance of food
markets in recipient countries when they resulted in excessive supplies of low-cost food in the
recipient country.
7  Repeating this type of experience every three- to seven years will hinder the
development of local food marketing systems able to mobilize domestic surpluses when they
exist and access international supplies on a commercial basis when needed.
This is not an argument against the use of food aid in responding to drought.  It is likely that
some level of food aid resources will continue to be available generally and their availability will
likely increase when poor countries are affected by severe crises.  These countries, Mozambique
included, would be poorly served by advice to not utilize these resources.  This is an argument to
enhance the role that markets play in the mixture of responses to drought.  This paper will show
that food markets played a very important role in the distribution of food aid in past years in
Mozambique; this experience needs to be pushed forward to further enhance markets’ role in
responding to future crises, to the benefit of Mozambican consumers and farmers.
Key Challenges
The key challenge of government and donors during 1998 and in future crises is to plan and
execute the food aid response to drought to meet the real humanitarian needs of the populace
while facilitating a maximum role for markets.  This will require a reversal in the typical
approach to designing drought response.  We suggest a three-step process:9
￿ Start by focusing on markets: Determine what markets are capable of in terms of the
volume of additional grain they can bring to the country through commercial imports,
geographical areas they can cover (whether with commercial imports or monetized food
aid), and proportions of the population in these areas that will have sufficient purchasing
power, at some “reasonable” level of prices, to ensure a minimally adequate diet, 
￿ Facilitate market response: To the extent that this anticipated response by unaided
markets is insufficient, determine what mechanisms can be put in place to facilitate a
greater role for markets (e.g., additional balance of payments support or a foreign
exchange credit facility for use in importing food staples, temporary transport subsidies
on specific routes), and 
￿ Then turn to food aid: Design the food aid response to cover only those geographical
areas and populations that markets are not expected to cover.
Some might claim that the process just described does not differ substantially from that which is
typically followed, i.e., that food aid response is always designed to meet only the additional
food needs of a country during a crisis.  Yet several factors suggest that this approach is, in fact,
qualitatively different from that typically found in crisis response.  First, we suggest that the
process begin with markets and that it include an explicit evaluation of what role they can play. 
This must include the development and application of methodologies to determine quantitatively
where and how quickly markets can be expected to move food to outlying areas, and what the
approximate price mark-up will be in these areas.  Ideally, these estimates would be
complemented by methodologies to estimate the effect of drought, not just on the production
levels of households but on their purchasing power.  This will involve explicit consideration and
quantification of the extent to which household coping mechanisms, especially non-farm income
strategies, are able to offset the negative effects of drought.  Combining estimates of price levels
and of purchasing power of households will allow more accurate assessment of the ability of
markets to meet food needs in an area, and by deduction the need for emergency assistance. 
Thus, a key insight from this approach is that the performance of markets and the volume of
emergency resources required are negative functions of each other: reducing marketing costs or
increasing household purchasing power reduces the need for emergency assistance.
Second, the approach being encouraged here explicitly contemplates market-facilitating
functions.  Food markets in Mozambique and in developing countries in general suffer from high
unit costs for domestic marketing and constrained access to foreign exchange and credit to
finance food imports.  Combined, these two factors can, in the short-run during a crisis, lead to
skyrocketing food prices.  This is especially true when the crisis affects an entire region rather
than a country, as in a drought in Southern Africa.  In such a case, the informal border trade that
occurs continually among most countries in the region is less able to address overall deficits. Yet
governments, with the assistance of donors, can put in place temporary measures which may
dramatically increase the ability of markets to respond to these crises.  At least three examples
are worth mentioning, though many more could be investigated:
￿ A foreign exchange credit facility tied to imports of staple foods.  Such a facility, if
properly designed to maximize ease of access by traders, could substantially increase the
total volume of food available in markets.  10
￿ A temporary transport subsidy on selected overland routes could increase the number
of traders and the volume of food reaching outlying areas.
8  
￿ Cash for work in selected areas could increase the market flow of food and reduce or
eliminate the need for emergency food distributions in those areas.  Such cash for work
projects would need to be well publicized, including timing and total cash to be
disbursed, to ensure that traders realize ahead of time that there will be increased
purchasing power in the area.  If there are concerns about the availability of food, donors
could monetize food aid in a nearby urban market, or pre-position grain which could be
monetized should prices in the cash for work zone exceed certain pre-defined limits. 
Price monitoring of a range of basic staples would be a necessary adjunct to such an
approach.
Together, such temporary measures could dramatically reduce market prices in broad areas of
the country and thereby reduce the volume of emergency resources which the country requires.  
Finally, the probable results of this approach can be distinguished from those of more traditional
approaches in three ways:
￿ Greater reliance on market mechanisms.  Focusing first on private food markets, 
assessing their ability to access external supplies and to distribute those and monetized
food aid supplies to consumers is likely to reveal a greater market response capacity than
had been previously supposed.  Utilizing available empirical data to examine households’
ability to protect their purchasing power in the face of droughts is likely to reveal that
some households’ food security strategies are more effective than had been previously
thought.  Both of these findings will move crisis response planners in the direction of
greater reliance on market mechanisms.  Identifying specific temporary interventions to
facilitate market response will accentuate this movement.
￿ Lower total costs of drought response.  Greater reliance on private markets will lead
directly to a reduction in the costs of emergency response through reduced volumes of
emergency and, possibly, commercial food aid and reduced transport costs for both
types.
￿ Strengthened ability of markets to respond to drought in the future.  Like anyone
else, traders learn by doing.  Being allowed more room to respond commercially to the
market opportunities that arise from crisis situations, they will increase their knowledge,
improve their practices, and be better able to respond in the future.  If they are confident
that food aid will be managed in similar ways in the future, and if droughts are periodic
events as they are in Southern Africa, traders can be expected also to increase their
investment in importing and distribution capacities.  As this occurs, emergency response
costs can be expected to continue falling in the future.11
Markets and Coordination of the Food Aid Response: Mozambique’s Experience in 1992
Markets played an important role in responding to the 1992 drought, even before the war ended. 
During the 1992/93 marketing year (April 1992 - March 1993, the period affected by the 1992
production shortfall), approximately 40% of the maize food aid, and 36% of all food aid, was
monetized (MAP/MSU 1996).  These monetized food aid volumes arrived primarily between
May 1992 and January 1993, being sold in Maputo in the South and to a lesser extent Beira in
the Center.  Despite the war (which ended only in October 1992), this aid flowed quickly to
markets throughout the South and Center of the country through the informal marketing system. 
Traders from outside Maputo regularly arrived in the main informal wholesale market in Maputo
to purchase grain for shipment north.  Traders based in Maputo also shipped grain to outlying
markets.  As a result of this type of trading activity, yellow maize prices in southern markets
closely tracked those in Maputo, while those in the center tracked prices in Beira (Tschirley
1994).  Since yellow maize was not produced in the country, this close price tracking can be
explained only by the observed trade flows.
9
In addition to distributing food aid broadly throughout the South and Center regions of the
country, informal food markets channeled much of this aid into the small-scale maize milling
sector, with substantial benefits to poor consumers.  Based on much lower processing costs,
10
market prices of whole yellow and white meals in Maputo averaged 76% and 80%, respectively,
of the prices of refined meals of the same color during 1991-1997.  Whole yellow and white
meals were also present in Maputo markets during this time in 160% and 31% more months,
respectively, than their refined counterparts.  Research shows that households that purchase
whole yellow meal have mean incomes approximately 25% below those of non-purchasing
households, and that low income households are nearly twice as likely as higher income
households to consume whole meals when these carry modest (20%) price discounts relative to
refined meals (Tschirley, et al., 1996).  Finally, whole meals yield 15% to 40% more human food
per unit of grain than do refined meals, and at a lower price.  This must be seen as a clear benefit in a
country such as Mozambique, where the vast majority of the population has incomes too low to be
significant consumers of meat products (livestock are the principal consumers of the by-products
from refined meal production).
Despite the important role played by markets in the food aid response, coordination between the
food aid agencies and the private sector had serious shortcomings.  The emergency and
commercial food aid programs also showed little success in coordinating their activities.  The
results of this lack of coordination were apparent throughout 1993 and into 1994 in the form of
depressed prices of white and yellow maize.  In the commercial food aid program, donors
determined quantities on the basis of a food balance sheet, fixed parameters for per capita maize
consumption, and estimates of the population able to purchase grain in markets.  Once Ministry
of Commerce and donors determined overall quantities of aid and a specific ship had been
scheduled for arrival, consignees were allocated quotas.  Despite their knowledge of market
conditions in their areas of operation, consignees (the first-buyers of the food aid, selected by
Ministry of Commerce and donors) were not consulted on overall quantities needed nor on the
timing of arrivals.  
In hindsight, it is clear that such an approach was based on a series of assumptions which,
because they were unstated and probably not clearly perceived by those involved at the time,12
could not be evaluated properly.  Beginning at the most general level, at least three related
assumptions can be highlighted:
￿ First, that consignees would want whatever quantities had been programmed for the
commercial food aid program, despite the fact that these traders had not been consulted
on the overall quantities.
￿ This view was based on another implicit assumption, namely, that market conditions
making it attractive to purchase the commercial food aid would persist throughout the
drought.
￿ Finally, this implicit assumption about market conditions was based on still another
assumption: that emergency food aid would not appreciably affect markets.
Assumptions supported other assumptions which determined program design.  Mozambique was
not unique in this respect, basing its program on assumptions that were unstated and probably
only vaguely perceived.  Unfortunately, such errors may be especially likely in the hectic
planning environment often created during a crisis like that of the 1992 drought.  Yet the risks of
such an approach are clear: if any of the lower-level assumptions proved incorrect, the program
design could run into serious difficulties.  
This is precisely what happened.  Unprecedented volumes of emergency food aid arrived in
Maputo during December 1992 and January 1993, requiring the Maputo port to handle nearly
three times more emergency grain than during any previous two month period.  Coming on top
of similarly unprecedented commercial food aid arrivals in October and November 1992, these
quantities overwhelmed the capacity of the port (and the emergency food distribution system),
with results that invalidated each of the three assumptions highlighted above.  First, large
volumes of emergency grain were diverted to markets.  Though precise figures cannot be
established, knowledgeable sources within the emergency program in Mozambique estimate that
one-third of all emergency grain during this time was ultimately sold on markets.  Second, these
diversions, plus the arrival in June 1993 of approximately 40,000 metric tons of emergency grain
in Maputo (the largest monthly figure on record, arriving in the middle of the good 1993
harvest), changed market conditions dramatically.  Throughout 1993, real prices of yellow maize
grain at retail in Maputo were approximately one-half the levels of 1990 and 1991.  Real white
maize prices from April through November 1993 were 78% (68%) their level during the same
period of 1991 (1990).   In the central region, where data do not permit historical comparison,
retail yellow maize prices throughout 1993 and into 1994 were less than half those in Maputo,
and white maize prices were less than 40% of the Maputo levels and less than one-third of
import parity levels.  Finally, the low market prices lead many consignees to refuse their full
quotas of commercial food aid, and grain accumulated and began to spoil.
Consignees refused their quotas because market prices had fallen to levels below even the prices
that they had to pay to receive the food aid grain.  Consignees who had paid these prices in
recent months suffered significant losses as a result of the oversupply.  Some of these same
traders had earned large rents prior to the drought and in its initial phases when market prices
were still high.  This highlights a final failing of the food aid system in 1992: the setting of
consignee prices.    These prices were not related in any systematic way to international border13
prices, and fell to as little as a third of import parity levels.  Paying these low prices and then
selling into a competitive market when that market was still under deficit occasioned very large
rents for participating consignees.  That consignees could later in the process lose money after
paying even these very low prices is a measure of the extent of oversupply that food aid had
created in the market.
In short, food aid policy had both positive and negative effects on the development of food
markets in 1992.  Government and donors deserve high praise for their decision in 1991 to adopt
a more market-based food aid distribution policy, and for sticking with that policy through the
1992 drought.  Yet they thought through only a portion of the issues that need to be considered
if one wishes fundamentally to alter the approach to food aid programming.  Issues of
commercial food aid pricing and distribution, and of how to avoid the almost universal tendency
to overestimate the need for emergency food aid, must be more carefully considered now and in
the future.
Coordination Challenges in 1998 and Beyond: Measures to Improve the Ability of
Markets to Respond to Crises
Government and donors built the 1992 drought response on two legs: emergency and monetized
food aid.  The drought was severe throughout the region, meaning that border trade in maize
came to a standstill, and the country had essentially no ability to access commercial supplies from
outside the region.  The situation has changed a great deal in the past five years.  Foreign
exchange is more available, and many traders have a track record of regularly importing rice
from world and maize from regional markets.  Poor Mozambican consumers have demonstrated
their willingness to consume yellow maize when it is discounted to white; profit opportunities
will thus emerge from importing yellow maize as the white maize price jumps in a drought.  The
size and liquidity of the world yellow maize markets means that this product will be available to
those willing and able to purchase it.  Thus, the drought response in 1998 and beyond will likely
include three legs, emergency and commercial food aid and private commercial imports, and the
coordination challenge is thus likely to be even greater than it was in 1992.  
Government and donors run two related risks if they do not deal effectively with this challenge. 
On the one hand, they could displace private imports with an oversupply of food aid and create
confusion on the market side.  If potential importers expect that food aid supplies might swamp
the market as they did in 1992, they will either not enter the import market at all, or will do so in
much reduced volume.  Indeed, given the experience of 1992, traders are likely to require strong
assurances that a repeat of the 1992 oversupply will not occur if they are to be convinced to risk
their capital importing maize.  Clearly government and donors need to take active steps to ensure
coordination among themselves and with potential private importers.
The second risk that the coordination problem introduces is of insufficient market supply, with
attendant price spikes and increased hunger.  If government and donors anticipate a private
sector response through commercial imports but fail to coordinate with the traders who would
be its authors, the response could very well not emerge.  The country could then be caught in the
disaster of insufficient food supplies, very high prices, and starving people; the very specter that
so often leads to an excessive food aid response in the first place.14
Both of these situations can be avoided by designing and executing a transparent food aid
program that is planned and publicized well in advance.  There are at least three areas where
donors and government need to play crucial roles: 1) improving the marketing content of
Vulnerability Assessment methodologies, 2) implementing market facilitating mechanisms, and
3) aggressively publicizing the resulting drought response program in all its details.
Improve the marketing and household level data content of Vulnerability Assessment
(VA) methods:  It is common practice to use VA tools to identify those areas likely to be most
affected by drought, both in terms of reduced production and decreased purchasing power.  Yet
the usefulness of these tools could be significantly enhanced by incorporating more detailed
coverage of marketing issues, and by utilizing household level data wherever available.  VA
teams need to incorporate experienced food marketing analysts to utilize available price and
transport data (including information on road quality and transport times, which could proxy for
scarce transport cost data) to evaluate where markets will be capable of responding to effective
demand, and at what price.  Development of a national price mark-up surface (utilizing available
GIS software) reflecting the margins markets would require to supply different areas of the
country would be a very useful starting point in designing drought response strategies that
maximize the contribution of markets.  If available, use of national household level data sets to
calculate detailed breakdowns of household income shares would complement what VA teams
typically do in this area.  Especially valuable would be the ability of such data to reflect the
diversity of households in given areas.  VA methods which rely on key informant interviews are
unlikely to capture such variability, and this is crucial to effective targeting.  In Mozambique,
efforts are being made in both these regards; it is important that lessons be learned from this
experience to guide future efforts at data collection as well as analysis.  
Implement market facilitating mechanisms: At the national level, at least three areas deserve
attention in facilitating market response to drought.  These are 1) market information, 2) access
to foreign exchange, and 3) access to import credit.  In addition to these nationwide actions,
government and donors should choose from a menu of options to facilitate local market
response.
Market information should be disseminated aggressively and often through written bulletins,
radio broadcasts, press releases and other measures judged to be effective.  Information should
include a) updates every two- to three months of national, regional and world production
forecasts for white and yellow maize, b) weekly updates of national, regional and world spot and
futures prices for white and yellow maize and rice, including interpretation of the meaning of
futures price movements, c) regular updates (monthly if possible) of the national balance sheet
projections based on updates of the national stock situation and of private sector import
intentions, and d) regular updates on trade policies and practices in neighboring countries
including timely advising of any important changes in policy or practice, such as announcements
of measures to close borders to grain exports (a phenomenon which is already occurring in the
region as of early November 1997).
Access to and availability of foreign exchange may need to be improved if the macro economy
is to be isolated from the drought shock and if sufficient numbers of traders are to be able to
import to make the system competitive.  Mozambique has worked hard to achieve
macroeconomic stability, with a stable currency, low inflation and falling real interest rates. 15
These are preconditions for sustained growth, and must be protected in the face of drought.  The
Ministry of Finance and International Monetary Fund’s local mission must be involved in the
drought planning process to review ways in which the stabilization and adjustment program can
be made to accommodate an increased need for foreign exchange (and credit - see below)
without destabilizing effects on the exchange rate.  Donors and the Mozambican central bank
then need to be flexible in designing mechanisms that increase access to foreign exchange and do
not exclude all but the largest handful of traders.  
Access to credit in foreign exchange should be an integral part of any such mechanism.  
Allowing repayment in meticais would be necessary, as traders will sell their product locally. 
There exists a risk of currency devaluation and resultant depletion of the credit fund, but this can
be addressed through effective design and implementation of the foreign exchange fund.
In addition to these national measures, government and donors need to identify specific locations
where markets could function but are expected not to function effectively during the crisis due to
some combination of insufficient effective demand, lack of food availability, and high marketing
costs.  These problems could be addressed through a combination of cash for work projects in
the affected areas, monetization or maintenance of a reserve of monetizable grain in nearby
major markets (to be sold under specific and widely publicized circumstances, linked to market
price behavior), and temporary transport subsidies.  Effective implementation of such strategies
will require frequent monitoring of market and related food supply conditions in the target areas,
and aggressive publicizing of the details of all cash for work programs so that traders know
where, when, and how much money is being injected into these local economies.  Such activities
will break new operational ground for most food aid agencies, and they cannot be expected to
adopt them without serious evaluation.  Careful experimentation with such activities in a
manageable number of locations during initial phases may go a long way toward overcoming
bureaucratic and conceptual resistance within the agencies and toward refining the
implementation strategies themselves.  
Actively publicize the resulting drought response program in all its details, including
volumes, timing and geographical targets for free distribution; volumes, prices and locations of
monetization of commercial food aid; location, timing and value of cash for work programs; and
details of any localized measures such as pre-positioned grain which can be distributed free or
monetized under appropriate conditions.  Those specific conditions need also to be disseminated
with the rest of the program.
IV. Conclusions
This paper has highlighted both the positive and negative effects of the response to the 1992
Southern Africa drought in Mozambique, and has argued that government and donors need to
take concrete steps to enhance the role that markets play in responding to future crises.  This
argument should be understood in the context of a package of initiatives which are needed to
ensure continued progress towards sustainable food security.  These initiatives include 1)
consolidating reforms in the trading sector, 2) investing in cost-reducing marketing infra-
structure, 3) investing in the country’s ability to identify and disseminate improved production
technologies, and 4) continuing investment to improve the information base (and Mozambican
analytical capacity to use it) on food production, marketing, prices and consumption, as well as16
on socio-economic characteristics of smallholder households.  
Geographical and agro-climatic conditions in Mozambique mean that food security in drought-
prone southern areas, and production incentives in the more productive northern areas, will both
depend on trade.  This trade will be primarily regional when Southern African production is
good, and north-south within Mozambique when regional production is poor (Coulter 1996)
11. 
Simplifying international trade policy and clarifying the murky national regulatory environment
are both important steps for ensuring and strengthening regional and internal trade links.
Continued rehabilitation of the road network, especially rural feeder roads, is necessary to
reduce the costs of marketing maize and other products out of productive but isolated rural
areas.  Associated with the strengthening of the country’s export capacity is a need to improve
storage facilities and credit availability, possibly linked to inventory credit schemes in the North. 
Consolidating reform in the trading sector is also necessary if traders are to make these and other
investments necessary to increase their scale of operation and reduce operating costs.  
In the medium- and long-runs, food security in Mozambique will increasingly depend on
improvements in agricultural productivity.  This improved productivity will require substantial
investment in its research and extension systems, and in a private sector input distribution system
able to facilitate farmer use of yield-increasing inputs on food and cash crops.  After years of war
and neglect, the country’s agricultural research and extension system is exceptionally weak.  Use
by smallholders (85% of the population) of inputs beyond hand tools is nearly non-existent
outside of certain cotton outgrower schemes in northern provinces.
12  Technology development
and input delivery systems must be developed in tandem if the country is attain the necessary
improvements in its productive base.
The Mozambican Government has been very pragmatic to undertake empirically based dialogue
on food and agricultural policy.  With the long-run commitment of various donors, selected
Government organizations have begun to develop improved data bases on markets, and on
participants and problems in the rural sector.  These efforts need to continue to be strengthened. 
Among other benefits, these efforts will contribute directly to the issue addressed in this paper,
allowing government and donors to better assess and improve markets’ abilities to respond to
the recurrent drought crises which will continue to affect Mozambique in future years.17
1.  FRELIMO stands for Frente para a Liberalizacao de Mocambique, the revolutionary
movement that defeated the Portuguese in 1975 and has ruled the country ever since, winning
national elections in 1994 after nearly 20 years of one-party rule.
2.  It is likely that interventions specifically designed to improve access to and utilization of
food by vulnerable households have also had some effect on these numbers.  Yet the reach of
these programs is greatly limited by budgetary constraints and quantification of their
nutritional effects is difficult. See GOM (1997) for further details.
3.  Personal communication with co-owner of Inácio de Souza, wholesaler and miller north
of Maputo, 17 October 1997.
4.  Mozambique had no history of free private markets prior to the late 1980's.  Private trade
under both the colonial and FRELIMO regimes was highly controlled, including fixed prices
at all levels of the system.
5.  A negative element of this system is that prices charged to consignees were not related in
any systematic way to international border prices, and were often less than half import parity
levels.  Paying these low prices and then selling into a competitive market under deficit
conditions occasioned very large rents for participating consignees.  This issue will be
addressed further below.  See Tschirley, et al. (1996) for more detail.
6.  Government action is also needed, but from the perspective of strengthening and
complementing markets, and at times ameliorating their less socially desirable effects, not
substituting for them.
7.  Food aid programs have also had positive effects on market development under certain
circumstances, as highlighted earlier in this paper.  See MAP/MSU Food Security Project
Flash 2E (English) or 2P (Portuguese) and Working Papers 12 (English) and 12P
(Portuguese) for further details.
8.  The word "subsidy" today frequently evokes an automatic rejection by donors and,
increasingly, host governments.  Yet such a subsidy would effectively substitute for donor-
or government financed trucking of food aid into areas deemed "too isolated" from markets. 
Just as such targeted food distribution would be temporary, a transport subsidy would be
temporary.  It is also likely to be far cheaper than food aid distribution, and it should
contribute to private sector capacity to respond to future shortages.
9.  These statements are based on close observation of Maputo’s Bazuca wholesale market
during May-August 1992.  During this time, Food Security Project personnel were
conducting an assessment of Maputo’s informal food marketing system and were present in
the market nearly every day observing marketing activity and interviewing traders.  See
MAP/MSU 1993 for more detail on the results of that study.
10.    See Jayne, et al. (1995) for representative calculations of milling costs in industrial
roller mills and small-scale hammer mills.
Endnotes18
11.  Production in northern Mozambique is much less risky than in other areas of the
country, and is not strongly correlated with production in the rest of Southern Africa.  For
example, production in this area was better than average during 1992, when the rest of
Southern Africa suffered its devastating drought.
12.  Some farmers in these schemes use these inputs in maize as well as cotton, achieving
maize yields 3-4 time above mean yields without inputs.  These still nascent practices
demonstrate the potential in Mozambique for complementarities between cash crops and food
crops, as have been found in many other countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (MAP/MSU 1996).19









































1989/90 330,000 95,000 177,000 602,000 83,000 145,000 228,000 61,000 72,000 109,000 470,000 0 1,072,000 44% 15,000
1990/91 452,900 96,400 181,000 730,300 126,000 221,200 347,200 76,500 47,600 116,400 587,700 0 1,318,000 45% 15,405
1991/92 327,100 56,300 154,900 538,300 124,900 248,800 373,700 98,300 58,500 123,000 653,500 0 1,191,800 55% 15,820
1992/93 132,600 33,000 71,000 237,000 271,700 389,200 660,900 18,700 61,600 47,700 788,900 70,000 1,095,900 72% 16,248
1993/94 533,100 49,000 165,000 747,100 77,000 208,100 285,100 0 28,517 57,000 370,617 86,700 1,204,417 31% 16,686
1994/95 527,000 97,000 193,000 817,000 70,200 123,900 194,100 70,900 50,000 103,100 418,100 105,000 1,340,100 31% 17,137
1995/96 733,800 76,000 278,700 1,088,500 56,000 40,000 96,000 40,000 24,200 70,900 233,800 153,700 1,473,300 16% 17,600
1996/97 947,000 139,000 291,000 1,377,000  0  0  0 17,500 14,600 36,899 68,999  100,000 1,545,999 4% 18,075
1997/98 1,042,734 180,272 307,290 1,530,296 0 0 0 4,875 n/a 112,966 117,841  40,000 1,708,137 7% 18,563
1 Marketing year: April - March for DSA and MSU sources (May - April for some sources); Production refers to the relevant production for that marketing year.  Based on the 1994
Early Warning Unit/Ministry of Agriculture database, approximately 90% of total maize production is destined for human consumption, with the remaining 10% for seed and losses;
for the other cereal crops, 88% for human consumption, and 12% for seed, animal feed, and losses.  The Early Warning Unit estimates that 23% of maize produced for human
consumption is marketed; the rest is consumed on farm.
2 White maize imports are not included (where color identification was possible); in the 1990's, amounts have not been high due to supply problems in the region.  Local purchase of
white maize for food aid distribution was also not included as food aid since it is included in the production estimates.
3 Entirely rice and wheat flour except 1994/95, when less than 10,000 metric tons of white maize were imported from South Africa.  Informal imports are unrecorded and so not
included here.
Sources: Ministry of Commerce, Department of Food Security, Boletim de Segurança Alimentar (issues: Bol 4, 1991/92; Bol. 3, 1992/93; Bol. 3, 1993/94); Ministry of Commerce,
Department of Food Security, Food Aid Pledges and Shipments, 1990/91 to 1994/95 (November 1994); FAO Production Yearbook, 1989/90 - 1991/92 issues; World Food
Programme Interfais database; Famine Early Warning Unit, Ministry of Agriculture production database; and MOA/MSU Food aid arrivals database (See MOA/MSU 1993 WP#13 for
further information).
Table 1. Cereal supply in Mozambique, by source, 1989/90 - 1997/9820








  White maize grain 4,241 2,569 -39.4 Negative
  Manteiga Bean 10,523 11,663 10.8 Positive
  Peanut 11,520 5,212 -54.7 Negative 
  Rice 8,026 5,009 -37.5 Negative 
  Brown Sugar 8,415 6,698 -20.4 Negative 
  Imported Oil 18,698 14,549 -22.1 Negative 
Beira (Center)
  White maize grain 2036 1630 -19.9 Negative
4
  Manteiga Bean 15,311 9,206 -39.8 Negative 
  Peanut 15,452 7,901 -48.8 Negative 
  Rice 9,530 6,410 -32.7 Negative 
  Brown Sugar 10,703 7,595 -29.0 Negative 
  Imported Oil 19,897 14,972 -24.7 Negative 
Nampula (North)
  White maize grain 2,162 1,029 -52.4 Negative 
  Manteiga Bean 11,528 8,365 -27.4 Negative 
  Peanut 10,132 4,959 -51.0 Negative 
  Rice 8,788 7,334 -16.5 Negative 
  Brown Sugar 12,880 12,060 -6.3 Negative 
  Imported Oil 22,999 14,232 -38.1 Negativa 
Table 2. Real price trends for selected food products in principal cities of Mozambique, 1991-
199721
Trader 1 Trader 2 Trader 3
Quantity purchased (kg) 3.500 5.300 12.500
Capital invested (MT/kg) 1.400 1.400 1.400
Turn-over time 2 weeks 2 weeks 2 weeks




Equivalent in terms of
annual return to capital
381% 251% 107%
1 Method adapted from Sahn and Desai (1993), explained in MAP/MSU (1993)
Table 3. Yearly return to capital need to feed a family of 8, wholesale traders working
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Figure 1.  Per capita calorie availability from cereals (maize, millet, sorghum, rice,
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4/91 1/92 1/93 1/94 1/95 1/96 1/97
Month and Year
White maize grain Refined white meal Whole white meal
Yellow maize grain Whole yellow meal Rice
Figure 3. Real prices of food staples in Maputo, 5/91 - 9/97 (base=8/97)25
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